A large literature studies the impact of credit rating announcements on security prices and generally concludes that downgrades are bad news for both bond and stock holders. We show that this general conclusion no longer holds when we look in more detail at the particular circumstances of rating announcements. Specifically, we control for the respective reason cited by the rating agency in its rating report and for a contemporaneous involvement of firms in M&A transactions. We analyze stock returns and credit default swap (CDS) premia around the announcement of both rating reviews and actual rating changes. Our results show that rating announcements are not homogenous events. The size and in some cases even the sign of the market reaction depend on the circumstances of the announcements. This indicates that prior studies may suffer from biases introduced by the specific choice of data sets. We find evidence in favor of the wealth transfer hypothesis which predicts that an increase in leverage should be associated with increasing stock prices and decreasing bond prices. However, a closer look at the data reveals that this evidence is driven by firms which at the same time are also involved in M&A transactions. It is likely that the announcement returns in these cases are driven by other information than the rating information only. Surprisingly, we find that rating downgrades are good news for bondholders when the announcement is related to a change in the firm's capital structure and the firm is involved in an M&A transaction. This finding indicates a possible market overreaction to M&A announcements during our sample period. We also investigate the arrival of firm related and rating related media information and its relation with the market's anticipation of future rating announcements. It turns out that the anticipation ability differs widely among different reasons stated by the rating agency and is related to the flow of public information through increased media coverage.
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I. Introduction
A large and growing literature has analyzed capital market reactions to credit rating
announcements. Yet only Goh and Ederington (1993) have analyzed the reasons which are provided by the rating agencies in the corresponding rating reports. This appears especially astonishing in light of their key result that only a small number of stated reasons are associated with sizeable and significant effects on capital market prices and therefore are responsible for the findings of studies that do not condition on the specific reason. According to this notion, studies investigating unconditional capital market reactions would incorporate a measurement error in terms of providing average results which are only driven by a specific type of rating announcement with the remainder being irrelevant.
We replicate and extend the approach of Goh and Ederington by investigating not only the reasons stated by rating agencies but also the arrival of public news and an involvement of firms in M&A transactions. We investigate how these factors affect abnormal returns in the stock and abnormal spread changes in the credit default swap (CDS) market, considering not only rating changes but also rating reviews, which have become available after the sample period of Goh and Ederington. 1 Rating reviews are often considered to be a superior data source for event studies as it is less likely that they are anticipated by the market.
Since ratings are intended to be an indicator of credit related bond price risk, we expect rating downgrades to be bad news for bond holders (protection sellers in the CDS market) and rating upgrades should be good news for bond holders. For the stock market, the situation is ambiguous. Rating downgrades could be bad news for stockholders if they derive from a weakened ability of a firm to generate future cash flows. They could be good news if they are the result of an increase in leverage which according to Modigliani and Miller (1958) should increase shareholder wealth at the expense of bondholder wealth (wealth transfer hypothesis). Goh and Ederington (1993) test the wealth transfer by separately investigating downgrades that were triggered by an increase in leverage but are unable to confirm this effect.
We incorporate the arrival of public information by analyzing the amount of overall and of rating related news wire stories. Based on this data we are able to investigate their impact on market prices and their differences among reason categories. We also use this data to construct a proxy measure for "surprises". This allows us to test the difference in surprise among the respective types of credit rating announcements to deliver better insights into the effects on capital markets when different importance of information together with a corresponding rationale is disclosed.
We also take into account that firms may be involved in M&A transactions at the time of rating announcements. Since roughly 40% of our sample firms are involved in M&A transactions at the time of rating announcements, M&A involvement clearly has the potential to affect the overall results. We conjecture that these firms could have different announcement patterns. This may be the case when rating announcements are made on the same day as M&A announcements and the observed market reaction cannot be attributed to the rating event only. Otherwise, the market may react differently to the same rating event when firms are involved in M&A transactions because the valuation implications for stocks and bonds are different. Levy and Sarnat (1970) , Lewellen (1971) , and Higgins and Schall (1975) argue that mergers may increase bondholder wealth through coinsurance. In the absence of synergies, this should be offset by a reduction in shareholder wealth according to Galai and Masulis (1976) . Shastri (1990) mentions that bondholders of merging firms may also lose from expropriation effects. In order to control for these effects, we consider whether the respective firm is involved in a merger and acquisitions transaction as the target, acquirer or merging firm. Empirical studies generally show that stockholders experience strong positive announcement returns when the firm is the target and either no or small effects when it is the acquirer or involved in a merger. 2 Results for bonds are mixed. Early research on target bonds reveals insignificant excess returns. Billet, King and Mauer (2004) find below investment grade target bonds to earn significant positive announcement returns while acquiring firm bonds earn negative announcement period returns.
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Our data set encompasses a global sample of firms with active stock and CDS markets spanning from 2001 until 2007. We observe 1,501 rating events by Moody's, of which 705
are rating reviews and 796 are rating changes. The respective reason for a rating announcement is identified via keywords mentioned in the rating report and assigned to each rating event. The same approach is used to identify an involvement in a contemporaneous M&A transaction. Following Norden (2008) , the arrival of public information is measured by the amount of total as well as rating related news wire stories retrieved from Dow Jones Factiva.
Our choice to incorporate CDS in the analysis instead of bonds or loans derives from their ability to provide a better measure for obligors' credit quality. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) , Zhu (2006) , Norden and Weber (2007) , and Norden and Wagner (2008) show that CDS lead the bond as well as the loan market and are better suited for an analysis of market efficiency. Although CDS have not been initiated until the mid-1990s the CDS market quickly became the leading market for credit risk with no signs of contraction due to the financial crisis throughout our sample period. 2 An extensive overview on the literature of short-term stock market reactions to M&A announcements is given in Martynova and Renneboog (2008) . 3 Other relevant research on the short term capital market effects of M&A transactions includes inter alia Dodd and Ruback (1977) , Kim and McConnell (1977) , Langetieg (1978) , Asquith and Kim (1982) , Eger (1983) , Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Dennis and McConnell (1986) , and Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) . 4 The annual meetings of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) on April 16, 2008 mention a 37% growth for CDS from mid-2007 until year end strongly supporting a continued augmentation of the market for single-name credit derivatives despite the financial crisis which had strong negative effects on the liquidity and the market volume of many structured credit derivates.
Except Goh and Ederington (1993) , the literature that studies the impact of rating actions on capital markets has analyzed the general, or unconditional, effect of rating announcements. In an early influential study, Katz (1974) investigates the effect of rating changes on bond yields.
Subsequent studies amended the literature by employing rating outlooks and rating reviews 5 and by analyzing the impact on stock returns and CDS spread changes. Important research in this area includes Grier and Katz (1976) , Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) , Weinstein (1977) , Pinches and Singleton (1978) , Griffin et al. (1982) , Ingram et al. (1983) , Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) , Hand et al. (1992) , Wansley et al. (1992) , Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) , Goh and Ederington (1999) , Dichev and Piotroski (2001) , Steiner and Heinke (2001) , Hull et al. (2004) , Norden and Weber (2004) , Daniels and Jensen (2005) , Di Cesare (2006) , Micu et al. (2006) , Zhang (2007b), and Purda (2007) . Generally, negative rating events are found to affect security prices both in the pre-announcement period ("anticipation effect") and around the announcement date ("announcement effect"). All studies find negative effects on both stock and credit markets. For positive rating actions the existing evidence is mixed.
Some studies find abnormal effects while others do not. Insignificant results could be a result of the small sample size of positive rating events. Jorion and Zhang (2007b) provide evidence that it may also be attributable to the empirical design of the cross-section. Goh and Ederington (1999) presume that firms prefer to release good news to the market but are hesitating with regard to bad news. Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Norden (2008) indeed show that for credit quality deteriorations private information is more likely to be revealed to the market through trading implying that trading by informed parties in advance to a rating event can have an asymmetric impact on security performance. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) conjecture that rating agencies' loss function may be asymmetric resulting in the allocation of more resources to reveal negative information because their reputation is at higher risk. Overall, rating agencies have been found to produce valuable, pricing relevant information in the case of negative rating announcements while there is inconclusive evidence for the case of positive rating events.
Our results are in line with the prior literature when we analyze the general (unconditional) impact of rating events on capital markets. Negative rating events induce an anticipation and an announcement effect in stock and CDS markets for both rating reviews and rating changes.
We do not observe a post-announcement effect. The abnormal stock returns and CDS spread changes gradually increase over the anticipation period with the announcement generating the highest daily abnormal market reaction. Positive rating events, on the other hand, only generate an either statistically or economically insignificant outcome. For this reason, we fully concentrate the subsequent analysis on negative rating events. Kliger and Sarig (2000) and Jorion and Zhang (2007b) demonstrate that the announcement effect in response to rating downgrades increases by declining credit quality of obligors. Besides confirming their results we are able to complement their analysis by the incorporation of rating reviews which show even clearer results.
When we analyze announcement effects conditional on the respective reason stated by the rating agency we find considerable heterogeneity across the reason categories. The anticipation effect for negative rating events in both the stock and the CDS market is mainly attributable to rating actions caused by one single reason: changes in the firms' operating performance. All other reason categories show small or insignificant abnormal market reactions in the pre-announcement period. We find that the firms in this reason category also show a significantly higher media coverage in the pre-announcement period. It seems that the market's ability to anticipate the rating event is a result of public information arrival due to analyst coverage, technological advancement or disclosure requirements for firms.
At the announcement date, we observe significant abnormal returns in most reason categories.
Thus the rating agencies seem to add valuable information to the market across all categories.
However, the magnitude and even the sign of these effects differ across reason categories.
When rating events are the result of a weakening capital structure and the announcement comes as surprise to the market, stocks show even positive announcement returns. This effect is observable for rating reviews and for rating changes that are not preceded by a prior rating review during the pre-announcement period (i.e. come as a surprise). We also show that these cases are associated by strong increases in rating related public information. The corresponding abnormal CDS spread change is positive and indicates that a wealth transferring effect from bondholders to stockholders may take place as conjectured by Jorion and Zhang (2007a) .
In the final part of our analysis we break down our sample by separately analyzing firms that are involved in M&A at the time of the rating announcement and those that are not. The results are striking. Concerning the previously detected anticipation effect in the "Operating Performance" category we find that this effect comes only from firms without M&A involvement. Second, firms with M&A involvement exhibit surprising anticipation returns:
both stocks and bonds show positive abnormal market reactions in the 30 days prior to the rating announcement. It seems plausible to assume that multiple and partially offsetting effects are responsible for this result: stocks may rise in anticipation of an M&A transaction and fall in anticipation of a negative rating event, resulting in a net increase. This finding points to a potential bias in the prior literature on anticipation effects. If M&A related firms are included in the sample, the anticipation effect on stock prices is biased upwards towards zero and leads to an underestimation of the true size of the rating related effect on stocks.
Next we look at the announcement period returns of reason categories with M&A related firms. The results are striking again: stocks without M&A involvement decrease after negative rating events only if operating performance is the rating trigger. Capital structure is no longer associated with significantly positive stock price reactions and casts first doubts on the validity of the previously found evidence in favor of the wealth transfer hypothesis. For firms with M&A involvement, we find significantly positive stock price effects at rating review dates only for those cases where the firm is also the target firm and where the rating review is triggered by capital structure reasons. It seems that these cases are responsible for the previously found evidence in favor of the wealth transfer hypothesis. Overall, our findings suggest that the true underlying reason for rising stock prices is not wealth transfer from bondholders but a reaction to M&A related news. For a subset of firms the M&A announcement date is available to us and we indeed find that both types of information are often published at the same day, providing more evidence against the wealth transfer hypothesis. Comparable to the market's anticipation of rating announcements, this furthermore also indicates a potential bias in the prior literature on announcement effects.
One particularly surprising result is the fact that bondholders sometimes benefit from negative rating announcements: CDS spreads decrease when downgrades are announced and the respective firm is also the target in an M&A transaction. This finding is consistent with the view that M&A related synergies or coinsurance effects drive up bond prices. Alternatively, we conjecture that market overreaction may be at work here: the data show a considerable run up of CDS spreads in the weeks preceding the actual downgrade, presumably caused by a strong hedging demand from corporate bondholders due to takeover news and rumors. In contrast to the rating review which often coincides with M&A announcements, the actual rating change arrives later and constitutes good news for the CDS market in that it provides certainty again.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two describes our data and methodology. In the empirical part, we first present the impact of rating events unconditionally and then conditional on the reason stated by the rating agency and conditional on M&A involvement. Section four concludes.
II. Data Set and Methodology
The analysis is based on a global sample of firms with liquid CDS and stock markets and a senior unsecured rating by Moody's. Table 2 depicts the number of rating reviews and rating changes split into positive and negative events as well as the total number. Their quantity in each rating category is highly related to the respective sample size and comparably distributed over rating reviews and rating changes. Note that rating upgrades and reviews for upgrade account for 42% of all events in contrast to prior research where only few positive rating events were included. It is unlikely that our data set suffers from a sample size problem which may be responsible for insignificant findings in this group in other studies.
(Insert Table 2 constitutes a hybrid of "Capital Structure" and "Operating Performance" and captures cases where operating performance and capital structure are both stated simultaneously as reasons 7 Following the information about the possible or assigned new rating level, the reason for a rating review or rating change is generally provided in the second sentence of the rating report.
for rating announcements. Examples are reports that explicitly mention the relation of cash flows to debt levels or the relation of credit facilities to operating gains or losses. "Event Risk" comprises essentially exogenous events affecting a firm as for example industryspecific regulation changes, pending litigation or wars. Finally, the group "New Methodology" accounts for rating reviews or rating changes due to a change in Moody's rating methodology 8 and "No Reason" is assigned if a reason could not be indicated by the rating agency.
The reason for a rating review or rating change is identified via specific keywords mentioned in the rating report. In a first step, we determine a total of 45 keywords that often appear in the reports. As a next step, we identify the most important keywords for each report based on the assumption that the most significant factors are mentioned first. In a last step, we assign each report to a reason category based on the keywords and their priority ranks. Table 3 displays for each reason category the aforementioned 45 keywords by their priority and total occurrence. Keywords not occurring in our list are matched to the one closest in signification.
In the case of two or more keywords matching a specific category this reason is ascribed to the event. If all keywords indicate a different reason the priority 1 keyword is chosen. On the other hand, if the reason inducing the rating action is explicitly mentioned by Moody's we refrain from this procedure and directly employ it. Note that the majority of priority 1 ranked keywords found in the reports is related to "Operating Performance" which highlights the importance of this category for rating events.
(Insert Table 3 here) Table 4 shows how many rating events are triggered by the different reason categories.
"Operating Performance" constitutes the largest group followed by "Capital Structure" and "Financial Metrics". Breaking up the numbers according to upgrades and downgrades shows that "Capital Structure" and "Event Risk" are mainly associated with downgrades while methodology changes are largely associated with upgrades. Operating performance is roughly evenly distributed among upgrades and downgrades.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Using the approach of Norden (2008), we measure the arrival of public information via the number of news per firm collected from Dow Jones Factiva. This database includes more than 25,000 sources of English language newspaper and wire news stories. We identify the number of overall news releases as well as the number of rating related releases indicated by the keywords "rating", "downgrade", or "upgrade" in the full text of the respective article. Table 5 lists the average number of daily news releases in our observation period that starts 90 days before the rating announcement and ends 30 days after the announcement. We observe high media coverage for the firms in our sample: About 17 news releases are observed on an average day. 2 out of these 17 are related to the rating of the respective firm. The number of overall news and rating related news are larger for firms that suffer negative rating events. In the following we concentrate on news wire stories (e.g. Dow Jones Newswire, Reuters, AFX etc.) as these are released most likely prior to or at least simultaneously with newspaper articles and should therefore provide a better indicator for information processed in security markets.
(Insert Table 5 here)
We apply event study methodology to analyze the abnormal stock returns and abnormal spread changes in CDS markets related to credit rating announcements. For this purpose, we first derive a benchmark return and subsequently compute the individual security's deviation.
Following Warner (1980, 1985) , we use the market model to calculate the abnormal stock log returns for firm , i.e.
whereas denotes the log return of the market benchmark at time and the two parameters and derive from a regression of the respective firm's stock log return on the respective market benchmark's log return in either the time interval [-360, -121] prior to an event or, if not available, following MacKinlay (1997) , in the post-event period [61, 300] .
Note that we try to eliminate any possible biases that may arise from rating events affecting the benchmark derivation by using an estimation window for and that ends at 120 days before a rating event or starts 60 days after a rating event. We require at least 200 observations for their derivation in either time interval and have to exclude 22 rating events due to insufficient data. We employ the S&P 500, DJ Euro Stoxx 50, Topix 100 and MSCI Asia-Pacific ex Japan as a proxy for the market benchmark with regard to North American, European, Japanese, and other Asian entities, respectively.
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In line with Norden and Weber (2004) , the abnormal spread change is derived by subtracting the benchmark spread change from the individual firm's CDS spread change. The benchmark constitutes other firms with the same rating class. After a rating change, the firm is thus assigned to a new benchmark. Abnormal spread changes are derived from
with as the (old) benchmark index of the firm's rating class prior to the event at = 0 and denoting the (new) benchmark index after a rating change has occurred. The specification 9 As a robustness check, we also employ the simple difference of stock return and market return as an alternative benchmark.
controls for systematic spread change differences among broad rating classes as well as for maturity. Our CDS benchmark is derived from all firms within our data set that have the same rating class and that are not subject to rating announcements themselves, i.e. they are not involved in rating announcements in the following 90 days and have not been subject to rating announcements in the preceding 30 days. Due to the lack of sufficient observations the only Latin-American firm has to be excluded from the sample.
The abnormal returns of stocks and the abnormal spread changes of CDS are analyzed over a time period of 120 trading days or roughly 6 calendar months surrounding the respective event, i.e. an announcement of either a review for rating change or a rating change. This time interval is split into the three pre-announcement periods [-90, -61] , [-60, -31] and [-30, -2] in order to investigate possible anticipation effects, the announcement interval [-1, 1] to measure the market reaction to the announcement, and the post-announcement period [2, 30] . We employ a cross sectional t-test as well as a Wilcoxon signed rank test to test for the statistical significance of abnormal stock returns and CDS spread changes. While the former accounts for cross-sectional dependence it nevertheless requires a distribution assumption. In contrast, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is non-parametric and furthermore incorporates the magnitude of abnormal effects. We also report the percentage of positive and negative abnormal returns and spread changes.
III. The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements
We first follow the existing literature and analyze the unconditional impact of rating announcements on stock and CDS markets in order to assess the comparability of our data with the prior literature. In a second step we differentiate our analysis and separately study the announcement effect for the different reasons mentioned by the rating agency in its reports.
We are interested in the degree of homogeneity of announcement effects across reason categories in order to assess the universality of the results found in the prior literature and in order to assess possible biases that arise when empirical studies on rating announcements fail to account for heterogeneity within the data. In a third part we additionally condition on M&A involvement. We conjecture that even within one single reason category, there might be pricing relevant heterogeneity between firms that are involved in M&A transactions at the time of a rating announcement and those that are not. The section concludes with robustness tests of our results.
A. The General Impact of Credit Rating Announcements
The literature on the impact of rating announcements on security performance is manifold 10 and can be subdivided into the impact of rating outlooks, rating reviews, and rating changes on stocks, bonds and CDS. All three markets in general respond to negative rating events downward flexibility of CDS spreads. 11 Analyzing the sample over various sub-periods nevertheless does not change the overall result. Stocks on the other hand exhibit positive cumulative abnormal daily returns of about 3% for reviews for upgrade. Rating upgrades again seem to be irrelevant to the market. Overall, in line with the results in Table 6 , we find either statistically or economically insignificant results except for reviews for upgrade in the stock market. In light of these findings we refrain from a deeper analysis of positive rating events and focus on negative announcements only.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
For negative rating announcements, Table 6 shows that both stock and CDS markets experience abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period that starts 90 days ahead of the announcement ("anticipation effect") as well as in the 3 day window around the announcement ("announcement effect"). The magnitude of daily abnormal returns gradually increases over the anticipation period and peaks at the announcement date. No market shows a post-announcement effect, indicating that rating news are quickly incorporated into security prices. The overall effect of negative rating announcements on the CDS market is substantial:
when we aggregate abnormal returns over the event period [-90, 30] , rating reviews are associated with an abnormal CDS spread increase of 62.8 bps while the number for rating downgrades is similar (63.4 bps). The overall effect on stock prices is also considerable.
Reviews for downgrade display cumulative abnormal returns of -8.2%. Downgrades have an even larger return of -9.9%.
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The proportion of abnormal returns that fall in the announcement-period versus the preannouncement period differs between stocks and CDS. For example, stocks experience a 2.1% announcement period return for negative rating reviews (3 days * 0.7049% daily return) which explains 25% of the aggregate abnormal returns. For CDS, the corresponding figure is 43%. These figures indicate that the markets are to a large extent able to anticipate rating events and a large part of the price adjustment happens prior to the rating announcement. For actual rating changes, the announcement effect is even lower, indicating an even higher ability of the market to predict rating announcements. One obvious explanation could be the fact that rating changes are often preceded by rating reviews. However, when we exclude cases where a rating review falls into the pre-announcement period of rating changes we still observe a similar pattern (not reported). This indicates that there must be other reasons that enable the market to better anticipate rating changes compared to rating reviews. In the next section we will come back to this issue and investigate whether the arrival of public information may be responsible for the relative magnitude of the anticipation effect.
(Insert Table 6 here)
We also test whether announcement effects differ across rating classes. Kliger and Sarig (2000) and Jorion and Zhang (2007b) have shown that abnormal returns increase for firms with higher credit risk. We repeat their analysis and calculate abnormal returns separately for broad rating classes. We amend their work by also including rating reviews. For reasons of conciseness, only the respective announcement effect is reported. Table 7 confirms the general pattern that firms with lower credit quality experience stronger abnormal returns.
Especially for the case of rating reviews we observe gradually growing returns when credit quality decreases in both the stock and the CDS market. A similar but less clear picture arises for the case of downgrades. We have also confirmed this general finding for positive rating actions but do not report the results due to their small economic relevance.
(Insert Table 7 here)
We conclude that rating agencies are able to produce pricing relevant information in the case of negative rating announcements as the market significantly reacts to these news. The considerable run up of market prices prior to rating announcements indicates that one should be cautious in drawing conclusions regarding the direction of causality. Rating agencies seem to respond to changes in market prices and at the same time markets also respond to rating agencies' announcements. Our results are broadly in line with prior studies. Rating reviews are associated with comparable (CDS) or slightly stronger (stocks) announcement effects as compared to downgrades. This indicates that they may constitute a bigger surprise to the market.
B. The Impact of Reasons for Credit Rating Announcements
The rating announcements have so far not been conditioned on the respective reason stated by the rating agency. However, it is likely that different reasons for credit rating events should also induce different effects in capital markets. From a theoretical viewpoint, the wealth transfer hypothesis states that leverage induced rating deteriorations should constitute good news for shareholders when shareholders are able to exploit bondholders to their own benefit. 13 Goh and Ederington (1993) test the wealth transfer hypothesis but are unable to find significant results. However, the authors were in a rather weak position to find the desired evidence. Their data sample is small and they work with rating changes only. We saw that rating changes are to a large extent anticipated in the market such that the implications are not easily detected at the announcement date. We conjecture rating reviews to be a much better proxy for market surprises compared to actual rating changes. Furthermore, our study employs CDS spreads which are likely to be a better source than bond returns. Their response to rating events should be unambiguous (e.g., Jorion and Zhang, 2007a; Norden, 2008) although we expect the level of spread changes to vary among reason categories. Goh and Ederington show that only one subset of firms in their study is responsible for the conclusion that rating announcements have overall significant results. This implies that the remaining firms bias the total outcome towards zero and could also generate an insignificant finding for the whole sample, depending on the choice of data set. The rather large number of rating events allows us to initially identify six reason categories. Nevertheless, all events corresponding to the category "New Methodology" as well as to "No Reason" have to be excluded in the following due to their marginal occurrence for negative rating announcements. This leaves us with the categories "Operating Performance", "Capital Structure", "Financial Metrics", and "Event Risk" representing more than 98.6% of available negative events.
(Insert Table 8 here) Table 8 presents the abnormal returns of rating reviews for downgrade and rating downgrades in stock and CDS markets subdivided by reason categories. We first discuss the results for the announcement period returns and later investigate the anticipation effects in the preannouncement period. Overall, the results indicate large heterogeneity in the magnitude of announcements effects, the sign of capital market reactions, and the significance of abnormal returns across the different reason categories as well as markets and events investigated. With the exception of the "Financial Metrics" category, all reason categories are associated with significant returns when rating reviews are concerned. The significant announcement effects for rating reviews in the categories "Operational Performance", "Capital Structure" and "Event Risk" demonstrate the rating agencies' ability to add valuable information to the market even though Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Norden (2008) verify that a high degree of private and public information has already been revealed in advance. For rating change announcements, this is the case only for "Operational Performance" and partly "Event Risk".
Rating changes due to "Capital Structure" reasons seem to be well anticipated by the market and do not show abnormal returns, consistent with the early findings of Goh and Ederington (1993) . The same applies to all rating announcements in our "Financial Metrics" category.
This category does not show any significant returns both at the announcement day and before.
So we may conclude that the rating agency does not seem to add pricing relevant information in these cases.
Let us now look at the sign of the abnormal returns. All signs are consistent with the previous analysis for the total sample except the category "Capital Structure". In accordance with the implications of the wealth transfer hypothesis, our results for rating review announcements
show positive announcement effects in the order of 1.6% for stocks over the three day event period when "Capital Structure" is the reason for the rating announcement. Bondholders suffer from a spread increase of 14 basis points over the same period. However, the wealth transfer hypothesis is supported only by evidence on rating reviews, not for the announcement of the final rating change. As mentioned before, Goh and Ederington (1993) test this wealth transfer hypothesis with data for downgrades and (like us) find no statistically significant evidence. On the other hand, they conjecture that if these announcements constitute a surprise to the market, they should have positive implications for stockholders.
If one assumes that rating reviews constitute surprises but the rating change announcement does not, our evidence for rating reviews can be seen as evidence in favor of the conjecture by Goh and Ederington. We also perform a robustness check on this issue: it seems plausible to assume that the capital market is able to anticipate rating changes especially well in cases where the rating agency issues a rating review in the 6 months before the actual rating change.
When we remove these cases our results are again consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis. Downgrades in this category show positive abnormal daily stock returns of 0.4237% over the announcement interval [-1, 1] with the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test both significant at the 5% level.
The ability of the market to anticipate rating events and therefore the ability of the rating agency to still produce pricing relevant information at the announcement date is likely to be related to the news generation by the media. Table 9 reports the number of daily news wire stories arriving at the market, reported separately for the different reason categories. It is evident that a considerable number of news arriving at the market is related to ratings. During the pre-announcement period, we find between 0.3 and 1 rating related news every day. This is a clear indication that the market might be able to incorporate rating information well before it is publicly released. Looking at the "Capital Structure" category, we see that about 50% more rating related news arrive at the market prior to rating changes as compared to rating reviews. This is another indication that the insignificant announcement return is due to the ability of the market to anticipate these announcements early.
(Insert Table 9 here)
We also try to quantify the level of surprise by calculating the change in the amount of public information prior to a rating event to the amount of public information at the rating event, i.e. = −1,1 − −30,−2 . Table 10 shows the results and reveals that the strong increase in total as well as rating related daily news wire stories is also confirmed statistically at the 1% level for most reason categories. Both rating reviews for downgrade and downgrades seem to be surprising to the media and many investors. When we compare rating reviews and downgrades we find that reviews constitute significantly bigger surprises than downgrades. The only exception is the category "Event Risk".
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The incorporation of rating reviews in our analysis accordingly constitutes a superior proxy for surprise announcements in financial markets. For this reason, the positive abnormal stock returns for rating reviews related to "Capital Structure" and the corresponding positive abnormal CDS spread changes provide strong empirical evidence for the wealth transfer hypothesis in case of surprising rating announcements. Summing up, we are able to confirm a wealth transferring effect from bondholders to stockholders, as conjectured by Goh and Ederington (1993) , Jorion and Zhang (2007a) or Micu et al. (2007) . In the next section, we will further elaborate on this effect by investigating the robustness of this result for firms with and without a contemporary involvement in M&A transactions at the time of the rating announcement.
Our findings provide evidence that prior studies that do not account for the reason category may suffer from a sample selection bias. The size and in the case of stocks even the direction of abnormal effects to rating announcements depends on the specific circumstances of the rating announcement. In an unconditional analysis of the stock price reaction to negative rating reviews the results of different empirical studies could vary between -4.7733% and 1.6623%, depending on the specific sample chosen. Overall, our findings show that the results on the unconditional impact of rating events on capital markets should be interpreted with caution.
(Insert Table 10 here)
14 Note that rating actions for "Event Risk" are often in response to known events (Goh and Ederington (1993) ) what is also reflected in the already strong increase of news in the event window [-30, -2] shown in Table 9 . This might explain the surprise comparability among rating types.
We now discuss the returns in the pre-announcement period. Only the categories "Event Risk" and "Operating Performance" show statistically significant results over event windows prior to the announcement. Regarding "Event Risk", the negative abnormal stock returns and the positive abnormal CDS spread changes over the interval [-30, -2] for both rating reviews and rating changes are not surprising because rating actions for this group are often in response to known events (Goh and Ederington (1993) ) and therefore reflect the point in time when the information becomes publicly available. This is also confirmed in Table 9 where "Event Risk" reveals a strong increase in general as well as rating related public information for this event window. The amount of public information compared to the respective event windows with insignificant abnormal performance is significantly larger at the 5% level confirmed in a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test 15 . Moreover, Norden (2008) shows that the degree of private information substantially influences CDS spreads in advance to rating announcements while Acharya and Johnson (2007) demonstrate that the information flow from CDS to stocks increases the higher this degree. Therefore assuming a high degree of private information prior to at least some events, the anticipation effect for "Event Risk" might also to some extent derive from trading in the CDS market by informed participants. In contrast to the result in Goh and Ederington (1993) , we can show that "Operating Performance" has statistically significant abnormal returns over the whole anticipation period [-90, -2] . This result holds both for rating reviews and rating changes and both for the stock and the CDS market. It is presumably attributable to easier access to information for market participants facilitated by technological advancement and additionally stricter disclosure requirements for firms over the last years. The future operating performance of firms furthermore also constitutes the main focus of analysts. Altogether, this argues for a high degree of public information for this category which is confirmed in Table 9 . All anticipation windows for "Operating Performance" reveal a significantly larger amount of general and rating related news wire stories compared to the respective event windows with no rating anticipation effect. In line with Norden (2008) who shows public information to substantially affect the market's anticipation of rating events it reflects increased media attention and investors' alertness to possible changes in firms' future operating performance.
The insignificant results for all other reason categories over anticipation windows in Table 8 again indicate the possibility of a bias in the results on the general impact of rating events, i.e.
the total data sample, depending on the choice of data set as many insignificant events can be included which distort the overall outcome towards zero. Incorporating only significant reason categories 16 , the difference in cumulative abnormal stock returns over the anticipation period for reviews (downgrades) in the stock market amounts to a 6.29% (2.53%) larger decrease compared to the result for the whole data set. The impact has a lower magnitude in the CDS market with a cumulative abnormal spread change difference of 6.3 bps (5.1 bps) for reviews (downgrades).
C. The Impact of Reasons for Credit Rating Announcements conditional on contemporaneous M&A involvement of firms
Rating changes often happen in the context of M&A transactions. It could be the case that these rating announcements occur on days when also different transaction related information is revealed to the market. Alternatively, it could be that the market reacts differently to these announcements due to issues such as contemporaneous liquidity in the stock and the CDS market, price impacts of large players in the transaction or the specific rating policy of rating agencies in the context of M&A. The literature on M&A presents various reasons why stock and bond prices are affected by M&A transactions. In particular, mergers can increase 16 As a measure for statistically significant event windows, we employ "Operating Performance" in the event windows [-90, -61] and [-60, -31] , and estimate events for the categories "Operating Performance" and "Event Risk" collectively for the interval [-30, -2] . Although other categories in some cases reveal minor statistical significances they should not considerably influence our point.
bondholder wealth through coinsurance when imperfectly correlated cash flows of merging firms reduce default risk. This may produce a wealth transferring effect from stockholders to bondholders. Levy and Sarnat (1970) , Lewellen (1971) , and Higgins and Schall (1975) illustrate that mergers may increase bondholder wealth. Galai and Masulis (1976) further reason that the increase in bondholder wealth through coinsurance should be offset by a decrease in stockholder wealth. On the other hand, bondholders may alternatively also lose from expropriation effects (Shastri (1990)). Empirical research in this area in general reveals positive returns for target stockholders and either no or only small positive returns when the firm is the acquirer or involved in a merger (e.g., Table 2 in Martynova and Renneboog (2008)). Billet, King and Mauer (2004) show that target bondholders of non-investment grade rated firms gain while acquiring firm bondholders loose at the announcement of M&A transactions.
Since M&A involvement could affect the capital market reaction to rating announcements in many ways, we additionally control for the involvement of the respective firm in a merger and acquisitions transaction as the target, acquirer or merging firm. We assign an M&A involvement to the respective rating event if it is mentioned in the respective rating agency's report. Using this approach, we identify 38.5% of all rating reviews for downgrade as being associated with an M&A transaction. For downgrades, the number is 20%. 17 Given the substantial amount of observations, any difference in the return patterns of M&A related firms and non M&A related firms clearly has the potential to affect the results of rating event studies.
The results for the anticipation effect are reported in Table 11 . In the previous section, we saw that the anticipation result was mainly driven by cases in the "Operating Performance"
category. Besides this category, only "Event Risk" also showed abnormal performances over the [-30, -2] pre-announcement period. We identify only one M&A related event for this group which should not result in a bias. For this reason, we concentrate on the anticipation effect for the whole data set and "Operating Performance" cases and investigate the impact of M&A involvement for these samples. Table 11 clearly shows that the previously found anticipation effect is only driven by firms which are not involved in M&A. These firms have strong and significantly negative stock price reactions of about 0.25% per day over the 29 days preceding a rating review announcement. This is about twice as strong as the effect found for the whole sample with M&A related firms. Contemporaneous M&A introduces an upward bias into the analysis. In fact, according to the Wilcoxon signed rank test, the M&A related subsample exhibits significantly positive abnormal returns during the 30 days preceding the rating review announcement. Presumably this is due to price reactions to other M&A related information in this time period. We conclude that contemporaneous M&A involvement at the time of the rating announcement strongly biases the results on the anticipation effect of rating announcements towards zero.
(Insert Table 11 here)
We now turn to the announcement effect conditional on M&A involvement. Table 12 shows the mean abnormal returns in the announcement period for the total data set as well as for the subsets driven by "Operating Performance" and "Capital Structure" conditional on contemporaneous M&A involvement of the respective firm. It is evident that M&A involvement has a large impact on abnormal returns in both the stock and CDS market. When rating reviews are triggered by "Operating Performance", abnormal returns are large and significant for firms without M&A involvement only. For M&A related firms, we see much smaller, and in the case of stocks even insignificant announcement effects. The results suggest that capital markets interpret a negative rating review in the context of M&A very differently than in other times and react accordingly. Another explanation of our findings might be that other unobserved information becomes public in the announcement period and affects prices in the opposite direction of the rating announcement, thus reducing the rating induced effect on prices.
Our results for the "Capital Structure" category show how easily one can draw questionable conclusions if the analysis does not apply the appropriate controls. Remember that the results from the preceding section provided strong support in favor of the wealth transfer hypothesis by showing that capital structure related rating deteriorations lead to stockholder gains at the expense of bondholders. However, after introducing an additional control for M&A involvement, we see that this result is only driven by M&A related firms. Firms that are not involved in an M&A transaction at the time of the rating announcement exhibit only small and insignificant stock price reactions. This is inconsistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis.
Looking in more detail at the M&A related sample we see that the positive stock price reactions found in the previous section can be attributed to only one specific group: target firms in M&A transactions. In line with prior empirical research on the capital market reactions to M&A announcements, target stockholders benefit and target bondholders loose less in spite of a negative rating review. We are interested to know whether other M&A related news announcements are responsible for this surprising result. For a subsample of the M&A related transactions we researched the M&A announcement date and found that it often coincides with the rating review date. When both types of information are published at the same day, the announcement effect of course shows confounding effects triggered by two independent factors and should not be misinterpreted as being driven by the rating announcement only. The fact that rating announcements and M&A announcements sometimes coincide lets us conclude that empirical studies on rating announcements can lead to wrong and biased results if these are affected by confounding multiple events.
Although the wealth transfer hypothesis finds no support for non M&A related firms, it still seems to be empirically supported for M&A related firms: stockholders of M&A related firms enjoy significantly positive announcement returns while CDS spreads of these firms increase significantly. A further break down of these numbers on the other hand shows that this does not constitute a transfer of wealth between bondholders and shareholders and thus is not evidence in favor of the wealth transfer hypothesis: the winning shareholders are shareholders of target firms while the losing bond investors are the investors of acquiring firms. We can thus reject the hypothesis that announcement returns exhibit a leverage induced transfer of wealth between bondholders and stockholders. Summing up, the results in Table 12 imply that is imperative for a test of the wealth transfer hypothesis to not only account for the reason of a rating announcement but also for the type of M&A. A wealth transferring effect from bondholders to stockholders would be observed for rating reviews due to "Capital Structure"
if it is only conditioned on the reason stated by the rating agency. The conditioning only on M&A involvement would again suggest a wealth transfer of the same direction for M&A related rating reviews. Only after introducing proper controls we find that both conclusions are invalid. Table 12 depicts the announcement effects of rating changes. Within the category "Capital Structure", we obtain a surprising and striking result: Downgrades constitute good news for bondholders if the firm is also involved in an M&A transaction. On average, CDS spreads decrease by 4 basis points. A closer look at the data reveals that this effect is mainly driven by target firms where CDS spreads decrease by 14 basis points over the 3 day event window. This effect does not seem to be driven by contemporaneous M&A announcements as both dates in almost no case coincide for the subset of firms with known M&A announcement dates. However, the rating change is often announced prior to deal completion and accordingly might be a further confirmation of a successful transaction. One possible explanation for this finding could be that the market expected even worse rating related news than the final downgrade announcement published by the rating agency. If there is truth in this explanation, the CDS market possibly overreacts in these cases: CDS spreads may shoot up after deal announcement by an amount that is larger than the fundamentally justified. After a while, the market returns to its fundamental equilibrium and in this time period the downgrade decision is announced by the rating agency. The initial overshooting of CDS premia could be for example induced by a massive hedging demand in the CDS market from corporate bondholders.
Panel B of
(Insert Table 12 Considering CDS, Figure 2 shows that the extent of average abnormal CDS spread changes differs considerably among reason categories. Comparing for example "Event Risk" to "Capital Structure" the difference of cumulative spread changes over the period [-90, 1] amounts to 88 bps for rating reviews for downgrade and even 114 bps for rating downgrades.
These large differences cast doubt on the rating agencies' ability to provide relevant and accurate information to the market during our sample period. Investors at least seem to make use of other pricing relevant information when determining CDS prices.
In the category "Event Risk" we observe a remarkable run up of CDS spreads prior to the rating downgrade followed by a reciprocal decline of spreads after the downgrade. The same pattern is observed for reviews for downgrade although much weaker. These patterns again indicate the possibility of overreactions in the CDS market. However, the sample size is too small (37 and 18) to draw definite conclusions.
D. Robustness Tests
The CDS market was initiated not until the mid-1990s and grew considerably over our observation period from $631. Furthermore, an analysis of positive rating events conditional on their respective reason reveals that no single group, adverse effects or M&A relation is responsible for the overall either insignificant or just marginal findings. We find that the significant positive announcement effect for reviews for upgrade in the stock market largely derives from events related to "Operating Performance". This might explain the heterogeneous results in prior 18 The figures for the outstanding notional of CDS derive from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and are based on market surveys published semiannually.
studies on the impact of positive rating announcements on stock markets and would provide a first example for the possible biases we have shown for negative events. While some studies presumably incorporate a high number of rating events related to "Operating Performance"
and find statistical significances, others may include less and discover no effects.
Pre-announcement returns may be contaminated when rating reviews fall in the considered time window. We have also decontaminated the sample by excluding events where the event period overlaps. Neither the major results nor the variations in our robustness tests show any
inconsistency. In addition, we varied the calculation methodologies for abnormal stock returns and abnormal CDS spread changes. For stocks we employ a simple stock index adjustment.
We also test a different approach for the CDS benchmark. In a first step, daily spread changes are calculated at the firm level which are subsequently aggregated to their respective benchmark. The standard approach introduced in Norden and Weber (2004) 
IV. Conclusion
The effect of rating reviews and rating changes on stock and CDS markets is more complex than previously known. The specific circumstances of rating announcements such as the stated reason, firm related news arriving at the market, and the contemporaneous involvement in M&A transactions all affect the market response to rating announcements and the preannouncement anticipation by the markets. We show that negative rating events induce a negative abnormal stock performance which gradually increases over the pre-announcement period and peaks at the announcement of the event. The same is true for abnormal CDS spread changes in the positive direction. Conditioning on the reason for the respective rating announcement we find large heterogeneity in the size and partly even the direction of capital market reactions to rating announcements. The anticipation effect of negative rating events found for the whole data set is driven mainly by announcements in relation to "Operating Performance" and to some extent also by "Event Risk" with the remainder being irrelevant.
The significant announcement effect for negative rating events in both the stock and the CDS market confirmed for most reason categories is a sign for the rating agencies' ability to provide pricing relevant information to the market. Positive rating actions in general have no economically meaningful impact on security prices.
Rating reviews and also rating changes without a preceding review constitute considerably bigger surprises to the market than rating changes. This study is the first that conditions rating announcements on the reason mentioned by the rating agency as well as contemporaneous M&A involvement of the respective firm at the time of the rating announcement. We show that a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders would be observed if we only conditioned on one of the two. However, the wealth transferring effect disappears when the data are analyzed conditional on both. Finally, negative rating events are not always bad news for bond investors. Downgrades that are capital structure induced and happen in the context of an M&A transaction exhibit significantly positive announcement returns to bondholders.
The results have important implications for the interpretation of prior research and provide new insights for investors. Studies which do not control for the reason of the respective rating event and for contemporaneous M&A involvement conceivably merge significant with insignificant influences and even incorporate opposite effects and thus should be interpreted with great caution. The heterogeneous findings among prior studies on the impact of positive rating announcements on capital markets may be the result of the hidden heterogeneity in the data.
Our results show that the significant announcement effect in the stock market in response to reviews for upgrade is driven by only one reason category. This implies that those studies which use a high number of rating events related to this category find strong results while others include less and discover no effects. The detected heterogeneity is important not only statistically but also economically. The difference of abnormal CDS spread changes among different reason categories can amount to 88 bps for rating reviews for downgrade and even to 114 bps for rating downgrades. Besides the rating itself, the reason for rating change seems to proxy for important pricing relevant information that is not incorporated into the rating information.
TABLE 1 Number of Firms, Observations and Events by Geographical Region, and CDS Spread Level in basis points and Number of Observations over Years and Broad Rating Classes
In Panel A the number of firms, observations, and rating events including both rating reviews and rating changes are displayed. Panel B provides the CDS spread level in basis points and the number of observations in the brackets beneath for broad rating classes on an annual basis and for the whole data set. 
Panel
Number of Rating Reviews and Rating Changes by Broad Rating Classes
The table displays the number of rating reviews and rating changes, respectively, split into negative (down), positive (up) and total events for broad rating classes as well as for investment grade and non-investment grade rated obligors and the whole data set. 
TABLE 5 Average Daily Media Coverage per Firm over the Rating Event Period
The table shows the average daily number of news stories per firm over the event period [-90, 30 ] surrounding a rating announcement, split into negative (down), positive (up) and total events for rating reviews and rating changes. Wire news incorporate ticker news released by e.g. Dow Jones Newswire, Reuters or AFX. General news furthermore include newspaper articles. News are assigned a relation to a rating event if the words "downgrade", "upgrade", or "rating" are mentioned in the respective news release. TABLE 6 Mean Abnormal Stock Returns (MAR) and Mean Abnormal CDS Spread Changes (MASC) for Rating Reviews and Rating Changes
The table displays the mean of daily abnormal returns (MAR) for stocks and the mean of daily abnormal spread changes (MASC) in basis points (bps) for CDS subdivided by positive and negative rating reviews and rating changes over a time period of 120 days surrounding these events. This period is divided into five time intervals with the event windows [-90, -61] , [-60, -31] , and [-30, -2] measuring effects prior to an event, the announcement interval [-1, 1], and the interval [2, 30] to investigate a possible post-announcement effect. The null hypothesis for the cross-sectional t-test is MAR≥0 and MASC≤0 for negative and MAR≤0 and MASC≥0 for positive events. The null hypothesis for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is median-AR≥0 and median-ASC≤0 for negative and median-AR≤0 and median-ASC≥0 for positive events. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10%-level, ** = 5%-level and *** = 1%-level for both tests. The number of events over the respective time interval is represented as n. 
TABLE 10
The Surprise Effect at the Rating Announcement and among Rating Types
The table shows in the first two columns the change of the average daily number of news wire stories per firm from the event window [-30, -2] to [-1, 1] . The third column presents the difference of the change of the average daily number of news wire stories per firm for reviews for downgrade to the change of the average daily number of news wire stories per firm for downgrades. Wire news incorporate ticker news released by e.g. Dow Jones Newswire, Reuters or AFX. News are assigned a relation to a rating event if the words "downgrade", "upgrade", or "rating" are mentioned in the full text of the respective news release. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10%-level, ** = 5%-level and *** = 1%-level where we report the t-test for unpaired data and unequal variance among samples for the null hypothesis x≤0 at the top right of a number. At the bottom right of a number, we show in the first two columns the Wilcoxon signed rank test with the null hypothesis median-x≤0 and in the third column the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with the null hypothesis median-change in news for reviews for downgrade = median-change in news for downgrades. The fourth columns presents an estimate of the probability that the change of the average daily number of news wire stories per firm for reviews for downgrade is larger than the change of average daily number of news wire stories per firm for downgrades. The Anticipation Effect conditional on M&A involvement
The table shows the mean of daily abnormal returns for stocks in % and the mean of daily abnormal spread changes for CDS in basis points (bps) due to either a rating review for downgrade or a rating downgrade for the whole data set and the reason "Operating Performance" over the anticipation period [-90, -2] , split into the three event windows [-90, -61] , [-60, -31] and [-30, -2] . In brackets, the number of events over the respective time interval is presented. Besides reporting the results for the total sample, the data is further differentiated by M&A involvement and no M&A involvement at the time of the rating announcement. Comparable to Table 6 , the statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10%-level, ** = 5%-level and *** = 1%-level where we report the significance of the cross-sectional t-test at the top right of a number. At the bottom right of a number, we show the significance of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The table shows the mean of daily abnormal returns (MAR) for stocks and the mean of daily abnormal spread changes (MASC) for CDS due to either a rating review for downgrade (Panel A) or a rating downgrade (Panel B) for the whole data set as well as for the reasons "Operating Performance" and "Capital Structure". Furthermore, the results for contemporaneous M&A involvement of the respective firm at the time of the rating announcement are provided which are moreover split by the type of involvement, i.e. if the firm was the target, acquirer, or merging firm. For the statistical results the explanations for Table 6 apply. 
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FIGURE 1 Cumulative Abnormal Performance in the Stock and the CDS Market in response to Positive and Negative Rating Announcements
The figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns in % and cumulative average abnormal spread changes in basis points in response to positive (on the right hand side) and negative (on the left hand side) rating events in the stock (in the upper row) and the CDS (in the lower row) market over the event period [-90, 30 ]. 
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FIGURE 2
Average Cumulative Abnormal Performance for Rating Reviews for Downgrade and Rating Downgrades conditional on the Reason stated by Moody's
The figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns for stocks and cumulative average abnormal spread changes for CDS in response to a rating review for downgrade (on the left side) and a rating downgrade (on the right side) for stocks (in the upper row) and CDS (in the lower row). Besides the overall cumulative results, it also shows the capital market patterns subdivided by the respective reason of the rating agency for the rating action. 
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